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Abstract 
 
Brain drain has long been a common concern for migrant-sending countries, particularly for 
small countries where high-skilled emigration rates are highest. However, while economic 
theory suggests a number of possible benefits, in addition to costs, from skilled emigration, 
the evidence base on many of these is very limited. Moreover, the lessons from case studies 
of benefits to China and India from skilled emigration may not be relevant to much smaller 
countries. This paper presents the results of innovative surveys which tracked academic high-
achievers from five countries to wherever they moved in the world in order to directly 
measure at the micro level the channels through which high-skilled emigration affects the 
sending country. The results show that there are very high levels of emigration and of return 
migration among the very highly skilled; the income gains to the best and brightest from 
migrating are very large, and an order of magnitude or more greater than any other effect; 
there are large benefits from migration in terms of postgraduate education; most high-skilled 
migrants from poorer countries send remittances; but that involvement in trade and foreign 
direct investment is a rare occurrence. There is considerable knowledge flow from both 
current and return migrants about job and study opportunities abroad, but little net knowledge 
sharing from current migrants to home country governments or businesses. Finally, the fiscal 
costs vary considerably across countries, and depend on the extent to which governments rely 
on progressive income taxation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Two narratives drive discussions of the development impact of high-skilled migration. The 
first is the idea of a brain drain, whereby the departure of doctors, teachers, engineers, 
scientists, and other highly skilled workers decimates the human capital and fiscal revenues 
of sending countries (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974). Such fears lead to calls for policies to 
restrict the flow of highly skilled workers, such as demands that developed countries stop 
recruiting doctors from developing nations, and efforts by developing nations to restrict the 
ease of their highly skilled individuals migrating.1 Contrasting with this is the view of a 
highly educated diaspora as a potent force for developing the local economy through 
remittances, trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and knowledge transfers, with the 
experience of India and China in setting up technology firms as a result of diaspora working 
in Silicon Valley a prominent example (Saxeenian, 2002). Economists have also emphasized 
that the possibility of migrating may spur human capital accumulation, potentially leading to 
a net increase in the education levels of those in the home country.2 
 
However, what is sorely lacking in such discussions is empirical evidence as to what the 
experience has been in practice for countries facing high rates of high-skilled emigration. 
Recent large-scale data efforts have provided a much-improved evidence base with which to 
talk about the scale of high-skilled emigration (e.g. Docquier and Marfouk, 2004; Beine et al. 
2007), and in Gibson and McKenzie (2010) we have used data from three island countries to 
investigate the determinants of migration and return migration decisions by the highly skilled. 
Yet quantitative evidence as to the extent to which the many theoretical channels operate in 
practice in determining the consequences of high-skilled emigration is almost non-existent. In 
particular, it is unclear whether it is common for highly-skilled emigrants from high 
migration countries to actually be engaging in knowledge transfers, trade, and FDI, or 
whether the experience of Chinese and Indian IT companies is so famous because it is the 
exception, not the rule. We also do not have empirical evidence as to what the size of the 
fiscal effect is, and how the magnitudes of these different channels compare to the size of the 
gains experienced by the migrants themselves.3 The purpose of this paper is to provide the 
first systematic empirical evidence on these issues. 
                                                            
1  For example, in 2009 the Algerian Government said it would restrict study abroad scholarships 
granted to high achievers in baccalaureate examinations in an effort to stem a worsening brain 
drain, and Uganda began requiring doctors who wish to pursue further studies abroad to make a 
written commitment to return to Uganda. On the receiving side, the World Federation of Public 
Health Associations adopted a resolution in 2005 supporting ethical restrictions on international 
recruitment of health professionals from developing countries. 
2  See Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998), Stark et al. (1997) and Schiff (2006) for this theoretical 
debate, Beine et al. (2008) for cross-country empirical evidence, and Chand and Clemens (2008) 
for a case study in Fiji. Kapur and McHale (2005) provide a nice recent review of the literature. 
3  Nyarko (2010) provides illustrative calculations of the internal rates of return to tertiary education 
in Ghana that a social planner would face, allowing for both permanent emigration of the tertiary 
educated (‘brain drain’) and emigration followed by return (‘brain circulation’). The net present 
value from those who permanently emigrate exceeds that of the returnees and the stayers because 
the assumed value of remittances outweighs the value of extra output created by the tertiary 
educated who never leave. However the values used for earnings, remittances and migration 
4 
 
To do this we chose five countries which represent a range of the types of countries 
experiencing very high rates of high-skilled emigration. Tonga, and the Federated States of 
Micronesia (hereafter Micronesia), are small island states, which Beine et al. (2008) show to 
have the highest ‘brain drain’ rates in the world.4 Papua New Guinea is a larger developing 
country in the Pacific with much lower overall levels of migration, but also a high brain drain 
rate. Ghana was chosen as one of the best-known examples of a sub-Saharan African country 
grappling with high brain drain, and New Zealand as the OECD country with the highest 
brain drain rate. If we care about brain drain, it is precisely the experiences of countries like 
these, which have the highest rates, which should be informative, rather than the experiences 
of India and China, for which fewer than 5 percent of the tertiary educated population are 
living abroad. 
 
In each of these countries we pursue an innovative survey methodology, which consists of 
identifying a well-defined target sample frame of interest – individuals who were the top 
academic performers in the country at the time of their high school graduation – and then 
tracking down these individuals wherever they currently live in the world and surveying 
them. Altogether this involved collecting data on individuals living in 45 different countries, 
and asking them detailed questions about their migration and educational histories, and the 
channels through which they interact with their home countries while abroad. We then form 
counterfactuals for what these individuals would be doing at home through also surveying 
academically similar non-migrants and return migrants, and through direct elicitation.  
 
Through this approach we are able to measure and quantify a number of the key 
economic effects of high-skilled emigration. We estimate that the best and the brightest stand 
to gain $40,000-75,0005 per year from emigrating from these five countries. This gain to the 
migrants swamps by an order of magnitude any of the other measured impacts: annual 
remittances of $2,000-7,000, trade and foreign direct investment effects which are infrequent 
and at most of similar gross value to remittances, and annual fiscal impacts which are at most 
$1,000 for Tonga and Micronesia, $6,000 for Ghana, $10,000 for New Zealand and $17,000 
for Papua New Guinea. We also find migration to lead to large increases in human capital of 
the migrants; little evidence of net knowledge transfers to home governments or business, but 
significant provision of knowledge about study and work opportunities abroad by highly 
skilled emigrants. Our assessment of the likely size of possible negative externalities from the 
absence of these individuals suggests that such externalities are small relative to the 
magnitude of the benefits from emigration. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses our unique survey 
and the incidence of high-skilled emigration seen among the best and brightest, Section 3 
estimates the impact of migration on the incomes and human capital of the highly-skilled, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
propensities are based on reworking of existing data, rather than new empirical evidence, and also 
ignore distributional issues such as to whom the benefits accrue. 
4  These brain drain rates measure the share of adults with tertiary education born in a particular 
country who are living abroad. 
5  All values are expressed in current United States dollars as of January 2010. 
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Section 4 attempts to measure the value of impacts on trade, foreign direct investment, and 
fiscal balance, as well as to provide evidence on the extent of various knowledge transfers. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Surveying the Best and Brightest 
 
The small existing microeconomic empirical literature on the brain drain has generally 
focused on individuals from a selected profession. For example, Hunter et al. (2009) consider 
Nobel Prize winners and highly-cited scientists, Ben-David (2007) Israeli economists, 
Clemens and Pettersson (2008) African health professionals, Commander et al. (2004) 
doctors in the United Kingdom, and Constant and D’Agosto (2008) Italian researchers and 
scientists abroad. However, in addition to these studies lacking detailed micro-data on the 
interactions migrants have with their home countries, there are several concerns with such 
occupation-specific studies when it comes to looking at the consequences of high-skilled 
migration. First, the initial decision to become a physician, scientist, economist, or other such 
occupation may be closely tied to the desire to migrate – with skill-selective criteria for 
immigration to many countries, high talent individuals who wish to emigrate may select the 
occupations that offer the best prospects for doing so, while similar individuals who do not 
wish to emigrate may choose other occupations. Second, training for the occupation may 
itself only occur through migration. This is particularly the case in small countries, which do 
not have Ph.D. programs or medical schools. Finally, whether or not individuals remain in an 
occupation may depend on whether they emigrate or not - low-paid professionals who do not 
emigrate may move to more remunerative private sector jobs while emigrants may have 
trouble getting certified to work in their home country professions. For all these reasons it 
seems unlikely that the right counterfactual for a high-skilled individual abroad is someone in 
the same occupation in the home country. 
 
2.1 Our Methodology 
 
Instead, the methodology we propose is to define a target sample of interest that can be 
identified before migration has occurred, and then to survey these individuals regardless of 
their subsequent emigration and occupational choices. In our case, we specify the target 
sample of interest as individuals who were the ‘best and brightest’ in terms of their academic 
performance at the end of high school in their home countries. This can be objectively 
measured in terms of top performance in national examinations, or in terms of being named 
as one of the top academic performers in the school such as a valedictorian or Dux, 
salutatorian or proxime accesit. Moreover, it can be measured ex post, with the target sample 
then set as individuals who were top of their high school classes in earlier years who are 
surveyed in the present. In our application below, we focus on students graduating high 
school between 1976 and 2004, which gives a compromise between the better records on 
more recent students and the longer work histories for earlier students. 
 
We are not claiming that this is by any means the only population of interest for looking 
at the consequences of brain drain. But it is one important subgroup of interest - the academic 
high achievers. These individuals go onto work in many of the occupations that countries 
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worry about in terms of brain drain: our sample contains individuals who have become 
doctors, engineers, computer scientists, academics, scientists, and business leaders. These 
academic high achievers also go on to occupy a high earnings rank (for example, our average 
sample member is at the 93rd percentile of the New Zealand earnings distribution), 
highlighting the fiscal consequences of their mobility for countries with progressive income 
taxation. Moreover, it is a subgroup whose composition is likely to be much less affected by 
desire to emigrate than studies focusing on a specific occupation.  
 
Our focus on the best and brightest is also justified by the stress in the literature that it is 
likely to be the migration of the most skilled and talented individuals for which any negative 
effects are greatest. Kapur and McHale (2005, p. 97) write that ‘clearly people of exceptional 
talent have a highly nonlinear impact.’. However, little empirical evidence is available on the 
migration of the ‘best and brightest’. The only study which exists is a simple descriptive 
exercise which examines the emigration rates of graduate students of IIT Mumbai, one of 
India’s most prestigious tertiary institutions, in the 1970s, finding 31 percent settled abroad, 
compared to an estimated migration rate of 7.3 percent for engineers in the country as a 
whole (Sukhatme, 1994). 
 
2.2 Country Choice 
 
Brain drain rates, as measured by the share of tertiary-educated individuals born in a given 
country who are living abroad, are highest in small states and a few sub-Saharan African 
countries (Beine et al. 2007, 2008), and it is in such places that concerns about the possible 
negative consequences of brain drain are most common. We therefore chose to focus our 
survey efforts in such countries. We began by choosing three developing countries in the 
Pacific – the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea and Tonga, since the Pacific 
Islands are the region with the highest brain drain rate in the world (Docquier and Marfouk, 
2005). We then also chose Ghana, which has one of the highest brain drain rates in sub-
Saharan Africa and which has been one of the countries most involved in discussions about 
medical brain drain. Finally, we chose New Zealand, which is the OECD country with the 
highest tertiary brain drain rate. The population, GNI per capita in current US dollars6, and 
brain drain rate in the year 2000 for those who entered the destination country after age 18 
(Beine et al, 2007) are: 
 
• Ghana: 23.4 million population, $US670 GNI per capita, 44.9% brain drain rate 
• Federated States of Micronesia: 107,000 population, $US2,340 GNI per capita, 36.9% 
brain drain rate. 
• New Zealand: 4.3 million population, US$27,940 GNI per capita, 15.8% brain drain rate. 
• Papua New Guinea: 6.4 million population, $US1,010 GNI per capita, 19.8% brain drain 
rate 
• Tonga: 110,000 population, $US2,560 GNI per capita, 65.1% brain drain rate. 
                                                            
6 Population and GNI per capita are World Bank 2008 estimates. 
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 These countries offer an interesting range of population sizes, levels of development, and 
also opportunities for migration. Micronesia and New Zealand both have free mobility to an 
important migrant destination - Micronesia to the United States and New Zealand to Australia 
- whereas in the other countries individuals can only migrate through satisfying the requisites 
of particular immigration categories.  
 
2.3  The Sample Frame and Survey 
 
In each country we assembled a sample frame of the top academic achievers in the country, 
for individuals graduating high school between 1976 and 2004, using a mixture of 
government and school records. Appendix 1 discusses the specifics of sample frame 
construction for each country. We then attempted to track down these individuals and survey 
them in their present country of residence. The tracking effort was extensive, and involved 
visits to the high schools and home communities, online search, the involvement of school 
alumni networks where they existed, phone book searches by surname, and asking located 
students for help in identifying others. Individuals were then administered a survey with 
detailed questions on their migration and educational histories, their current occupation, and 
the channels through which they interact with their home countries when abroad. These 
surveys were carried out online, in-person in the five source countries, and, in some cases, by 
phone. The survey efforts began with the Tongan sample in late 2007, and finished with the 
Ghanaian sample in late 2009. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the results of this surveying effort. Our total sample frame consisted 
of 4,131 individuals from the five countries, of which we were able to interview 1,240 (30%). 
The survey interviewed individuals who are now living in 45 different countries. The survey 
success rate varied across source countries, ranging from 15 percent in Ghana to 73 percent in 
Tonga. This reflects both differences in our ability to track individuals from different 
countries, as well as differential survey response rates, with fears about identity theft making 
some high achievers reluctant to participate in an online survey. Even in cases where we 
could not survey the individual, we endeavored to identify their current location, either 
directly from them, or from friends and family. Current location is known for the majority of 
the sample frame from Tonga, Micronesia and New Zealand, and for 47 percent of the full 
sample. 
 
We view these response rates as incredibly high, given the logistics of tracking 
individuals over multiple countries based only on a name (which may have changed for some 
females upon marriage) and the high school they attended. This is particularly the case given 
the sample of interest are individuals with very high opportunity costs of time, who typically 
have lower survey response rates.  Nevertheless, we are sensitive to the possibility of 
potential bias caused by incomplete tracking. In particular, we can examine how sensitive the 
measured migration rates are to survey non-response, using both the known characteristics 
(age and gender) of the individuals not surveyed, as well as through comparison of the 
individuals who it took more effort to locate to those located more easily. The results suggest 
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relatively little bias from non-response, at least with regard to migration status.7 In terms of 
looking at the consequences of migration, we believe that if there is any bias, it will be 
towards not being able to locate the less successful individuals. To the extent this is the case, 
it should mean we are obtaining upper bounds on the extent to which migrants are engaging 
in certain activities such as trade and investment. Section 4.7 discusses robustness to sample 
non-response in more detail. 
 
2.4 Migration Rates 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that the incidence of migration is very high among this highly skilled 
population. In our sample, 65 percent of the best and brightest aged 22 and over have ever 
migrated overseas since graduating high school, and 36 percent are current migrants. 
Comparing these numbers also indicates a high rate of return migration. The highest rates of 
ever migrating are in Tonga and Micronesia, the two smallest countries. Both countries have 
very limited tertiary education options at home, and so migration is needed for education. The 
lowest current migration rate is seen in Papua New Guinea, whose citizens have rather 
limited options for migration. Educational scholarships which bond individuals to return are 
one additional factor limiting the extent to which individuals who go abroad to study can stay 
on and work afterwards in this case. Overall, the sample gives us a good sized sample of 
migrants with which to examine at the micro-level the consequences of high-skilled 
emigration, along with individuals of similar ability who are located in the home country and 
can be used in forming counterfactuals. 
 
3. Impacts on the Migrants Themselves 
 
In general, the largest gains from migration accrue to the migrants themselves. Yet 
measurement of these gains has been relatively neglected in the literature, with the labor 
literature focusing on the impact of immigration on natives and the development literature 
focusing on the impact of emigration on individuals remaining in the source country. 
However, ignoring the impact on the migrants themselves will lead to a very distorted view 
of the economic benefits and costs of migration for source countries, since the most major 
effect could be to make natives of these source countries considerably better off. We 
therefore begin with estimation of the gains in income and education that high-skilled 
individuals gain through migration. 
 
3.1 The Income Gains from High-skilled Emigration 
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the mean, standard deviation, and median annual gross income 
earned by individuals who are currently non-students and employed abroad.8 We convert all 
currencies to US dollars at the exchange rates prevailing at the time of the survey. The mean 
annual income earned by emigrants is $57,000 for Micronesians, $88,000 for Tongans, 
                                                            
7  See Gibson and McKenzie (2010) for details of this for New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and 
Tonga. 
8  The employment rate is very high among our sample once we exclude students, so we ignore 
selection into employment. 
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$93,000 for Papua New Guineans, $102,000 for Ghanaians, and $116,000 for New 
Zealanders. These are many multiples of per capita income for the developing countries, and 
considerably higher than the incomes being earned in the home country by return migrants 
and non-migrants (Table 2, panel B). A simple estimate of the income gain from migration is 
then just obtained by comparing these two means (A – B mean in Table 2), and shows an 
annual income gain ranging from $US35,000 for the Micronesians to US$79,000 for the 
Ghanaians. At a discount rate of 5% per year, the gains from spending 30 years working 
abroad rather than at home would thus range from $532,000 to $US1.27 million.   
 
Typically a simple comparison of migrants and those in the home country would not be 
very informative about the gains to be had from migration because of concerns about 
selectivity. In our case, such concerns should be a lot less severe, since we are looking at a 
group of individuals who are all very similar in terms of ability (implicitly we are already 
matching individuals in terms of performance in high school). To a first-order the non-
migrants and return migrants may therefore be a reasonable counterfactual for what the 
migrants would be earning were they in the home country. Nevertheless, we employ several 
approaches to examine how robust these estimates are. The first is to control for observable 
differences through a regression: 
 
ܫܰܥܱܯܧ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܥܷܴܴܧܰܶܯܫܩܴܣܰ ௜ܶ ൅ ߛԢ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜      (1) 
 
We control for age, sex, country of birth (since some of the top students were themselves 
immigrants), mother’s and father’s education, and self-assessed family wealth at the end of 
high school (above average wealth, average wealth, or below average wealth). These 
variables control for family background characteristics which might plausibly affect both 
income earned and migration choices. The results are shown as Regression 1 in Table 2. We 
also consider a second specification, which separates out the return migrants from the non-
migrants: 
 
ܫܰܥܱܯܧ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܥܷܴܴܧܰܶܯܫܩܴܣܰ ௜ܶ ൅ ߜܴܧܷܴܶܰܯܫܩܴܣܰ ௜ܶ ൅ ߛԢ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜  (2) 
 
This specification uses only non-migrants as the comparison group, rather than all 
individuals working in the home country. We discuss the coefficients on the return migrant 
dummy in a later section of the paper. Comparing the regression estimates to the simple 
comparison of means gives broadly similar estimates of the income gains, with the controls 
having most effect for Papua New Guinea and Tonga.  
 
A second approach is to ask the migrants directly what income they would expect to earn 
if they were instead working at home. This approach has the advantage of setting the 
counterfactual as exactly what we would like: the identical individual working at home. 
These high-skilled individuals seem quite well informed about salary levels in their home 
countries, and we see, for example, someone who says they would be an academic in the 
home country reporting they would earn an income similar to those people we actually 
observe in our data as academics in the home country. Panel C of Table 2 summarizes these 
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answers, while the difference (A - C) is the mean self-assessed income gain from migration. 
This difference is very similar to the regression estimates for four of the five countries. The 
exception is Tonga, where the regression estimates of $62,000-69,000 are a little bit lower 
than the simple difference in means of $76,000-77,000. Nevertheless, the simple difference in 
means is still well within the confidence intervals for the regression estimates even in this 
case. 
 
Finally, we attempted to construct instrumental variables for migration. We examined 
three classes of potential instruments. The first was macroeconomic shocks and political 
events such as coups; the second was birth-order; and the third was shocks such as parental 
illness and extreme weather events that occurred when the individual was aged 18 to 22 (the 
prime age for migration in the sample). The latter two categories of variables were only 
collected for Ghana and Micronesia. We found these types of variables had very low 
predictive power for predicting migrant status, with the only (weakly) significant first-stage 
being in Micronesia, where individuals who experienced a typhoon in their home region 
when aged 18 to 22 were more likely to have migrated (F-statistic of 3.63). The two-stage 
least squares estimate using this as an instrument gave a similar income gain to that obtained 
using the other two approaches. 
 
The estimates in Table 2 give the gross income gain from migration at market exchange 
rates. In Table 3 we examine how these gains change once we allow for cost of living 
differences and for net, rather than gross, income. The first column repeats the estimate of the 
gross income gain in U.S. dollars at the market exchange rate, based on regression estimate 2 
in Table 2. We do not believe that the International Comparison Program (ICP) PPP rates are 
the appropriate adjustment for cost-of-living differences among the countries in our study. 
First, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Micronesia were not covered by the ICP, and the model 
used to impute PPP rates for countries not directly surveyed takes no account of population 
size, remoteness, or ruggedness of terrain, all of which serve to increase prices.9 Second, the 
goods and services demanded by these high-earning individuals are likely to differ 
substantially from the basket of goods used for calculating PPP. For these reasons we 
consider an alternative cost-of-living adjustment. 
 
The cost-of-living adjustment we use comes from custom tables kindly provided by 
Xpatulator.com, a commercial service that collects cost of living in 276 global locations, 
which it uses to assist companies in determining expatriate pay levels and international salary 
levels in different countries. The overall cost-of-living comparison is based on a 
comprehensive set of consumption items. Relative to Washington D.C., the cost of living is 
estimated to be 38.1% cheaper in Tonga, 10.6% cheaper in New Zealand, 4.8% cheaper in 
Ghana, 14.6% more expensive in Micronesia, and 27.7% more expensive in Papua New 
Guinea. The higher cost in Papua New Guinea and Micronesia reflects much more expensive 
communications, recreation, clothing, alcohol and tobacco, and transport costs in these 
countries.  
                                                            
9  International Comparison Program (2008). 
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The second column of Table 3 shows the gross gain using this adjustment. The biggest 
change is seen for New Zealanders, whose adjusted gain is $25,329 compared to $46,155 
without cost-of-living adjustments. This reflects the fact that New Zealand is relatively 
cheaper to live in than the United States, while Australia and the United Kingdom, the other 
two main destinations for this group, are more expensive. The adjustments are smaller for the 
four developing countries, and in some cases high costs-of-living at home are offset by higher 
costs-of-living in the main destination countries.  
 
These calculations make no adjustment for the relative quality of living conditions in 
different locations. Xpatulator also provides a second comparison, which incorporates both 
cost-of-living differences and the hardship experienced by lower quality living conditions in 
different locations. We asked them to calculate the amount in local currency that would give 
the same quality of living as someone living on $US60,000 in Washington D.C. and use this 
to obtain a second measure of the gross gain. Column 3 gives these estimates, which are 
similar to those using only the cost-of-living adjustment. 
 
Grogger and Hanson (2010) find that post-tax earnings are a stronger correlate of 
migration than pre-tax earnings. It is therefore instructive to also examine the size of the net 
income gains, despite the fact that we are unable to measure the government benefits that 
might accrue to migrants in different locations from paying different tax rates. Column 4 
provides the net income increase at market exchange rates, and Column 5 adjusted for cost-
of-living. The net income gains are less than the gross gains in absolute terms, but are still 
considerable. Even after adjusting for cost-of-living differences and taxes, we still estimate 
the annual gain in income to be $30,000-$45,000 for the four developing countries, and 
$21,000 for the New Zealanders. There is thus a large economic benefit to the high-skilled 
individuals from migrating, and the magnitude of this will provide a point of reference for the 
impacts through other channels seen in the remainder of the paper. 
 
3.2 Human Capital Formation 
 
In addition to the gain in income, another important benefit of migration for the migrants is 
the additional education they can gain abroad. The income gains reported above already 
provide one measure of the economic benefit to the migrants from this additional education, 
but it is also of interest to look directly at the extent to which education is accumulated 
through migration. Panel A of Table 4 summarizes the educational levels of the migrants in 
our sample, focusing on individuals aged 22 and over, who might be expected to have 
finished their undergraduate studies. We see that almost all these individuals who were 
academic high achievers in high school have gone on to receive a bachelor degree, the 
exception being Micronesia, where 2-year associates degree were the highest educational 
qualification of many. In Tonga and Micronesia, 100 percent of the migrants had received 
their bachelor’s education abroad, reflecting the limited tertiary education options in these 
countries. It is also common for our sample to have continued onto more advanced degrees 
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such as a masters or Ph.D., medical doctorate, or law degree.10 These advanced degrees are 
almost exclusively earned abroad: 100% of the Tongan, Micronesian, and Papua New 
Guinean migrants in our sample with advanced degrees earned them abroad, as did 86% of 
the Ghanaians and 75% of the New Zealanders. This is despite Ghana, Papua New Guinea, 
and New Zealand having domestic education systems which offer the possibility of these 
degrees.11  
 
Panel B summarizes the corresponding educational achievements of the individuals 
currently resident in the five source countries. The proportion with a bachelor degree is 
similar to that of the migrant group, but lower proportions in each country have an advanced 
degree. In Tonga and Micronesia the bachelor degrees were mostly earned abroad, whereas in 
the other three countries they are mostly earned domestically. With the advanced degrees, 28 
percent of those in Ghana and 49 percent of those in Papua New Guinea had earned them 
abroad.  
 
Panel C of Table 4 then reports marginal effects from probit estimation of equation (2), 
using having a bachelor degree, and having an advanced degree as the outcomes of interest. 
The coefficients on the return migrant term will be discussed in the next section. We confirm 
the association between current migration and higher levels of undergraduate degrees among 
Tongans and Micronesians, although the relationship for Micronesians is not quite 
significant. There is also a strong and significant positive association between being a current 
migrant and having an advanced degree for each of the five countries. While part of this 
might reflect selection, the more limited set of educational choices in the home countries 
suggests that if many of the individuals had not migrated, they would not have obtained the 
education that they now have. This is confirmed by directly asking the migrants who are 
currently studying what they would be doing now in their home country if they hadn’t 
migrated: 0% of the Papua New Guineans, only 12% of the Ghanaians, 13% of the Tongans, 
and 18% of the Micronesians aged 22 and older who are abroad and currently studying say 
they would be studying now if in the home country. In contrast, 37% of the New Zealanders 
say they would still be studying even if they hadn’t migrated. This leads us to believe that 
most of the measured difference in education rates in Table 4, panel C is indeed the true 
impact of migration on human capital attainment for the individuals from developing 
countries. 
 
Finally, the recent literature on brain gain (e.g. Mountford, 1997, Vidal, 1998, Stark et al. 
1997) has emphasized that the mere prospect of migration can induce individuals to undertake 
additional human capital investments, even if they don’t end up actually migrating. If 
individuals are obtaining bachelors or advanced degrees for this purpose, then comparing 
migrants to non-migrants will understate the gain in education attributable to migration. More 
generally, there may be other improvements in human capital aside from degrees. Our survey 
                                                            
10  We classify a law degree as an advanced degree as in some countries it requires an undergraduate 
degree first, whilst in others it is a longer length undergraduate program than arts or sciences 
bachelor degrees. 
11  The Micronesians with Masters earned at home had earned masters in theology by remote study. 
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asked whether people had taken any additional classes, or changed the subjects they studied 
during high school to improve their prospects of being able to work or study overseas. The 
last column of Table 3 shows some evidence of people undertaking such actions, particularly 
in Ghana, and to a lesser extent in the other developing countries. The main actions taken 
were to take private lessons, study a language, and take test preparation classes to help pass 
tests such as the SAT. That is, among our sample, any effect is more in terms of what is 
studied, rather than how much schooling takes place. 
 
4. Empirical Evidence on the Channels through which High-skilled Emigration Affects 
the Sending Country 
 
We now turn to measuring the economic impacts of migration on the sending countries, 
attempting where possible to quantify these impacts and evaluate them relative to a 
counterfactual of what the individual would have been doing had they not migrated.  
 
4.1 Remittances 
 
Remittances are the most salient and researched contribution of emigrants to their home 
countries. However, there is debate as to the extent to which highly-skilled emigrants remit. 
Cross-country studies based on macro data have been used to claim the high-skilled remit less 
(Faini, 2007) whilst recent microeconomic evidence based on surveys of immigrants in a 
number of destination countries suggests that more educated individuals remit more, with 
tertiary-educated migrants from poorer countries being more likely to remit than those from 
richer developing countries (Bollard et al, 2009).  
 
Panels A and B of Table 5 show the incidence and level of monetary and goods 
remittances that the non-student migrants in our sample are sending to their home countries. 
Our survey data show a high incidence of remitting among the migrants from developing 
countries, with migrants from New Zealand being much less likely to remit. For the Ghanaian 
sample we can compare our results to the remitting patterns of all Ghanaian migrants in the 
OECD (Bollard, McKenzie and Morten, 2010). 86 percent of all Ghanaian current migrants 
are remitting, which increases to 93 percent if we exclude current students. This can be 
compared to a remitting rate of 66 percent among all Ghanaian migrants in the OECD. The 
mean annual amount remitted in monetary remittances conditional on remitting for 
Ghanaians in our sample is US$4,314, compared to US$3,614 for all Ghanaian migrants in 
the OECD. Thus the high-skilled migrants in our sample are remitting more frequently and 
sending more when they do remit than average migrants, even if the amount remitted as a 
share of income is lower. 
 
The unconditional mean and median amount remitted then include the zero remittances 
for those not remitting. The appropriate counterfactual here is that these individuals would 
not be remitting if they had not migrated. So the net effect of migration on remittances is 
simply the unconditional mean. Adding together the monetary and goods remittances gives a 
total impact of $5,000 annual remittances for Ghanaians, $2,100 for Micronesians, $625 for 
New Zealanders (monetary remittances data only), $7,232 for Papua New Guineans, and 
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$4,300 for Tongans. These amounts are significant relative to the per capita incomes of the 
developing countries, with Ghanaian and Papua New Guinean remittances equivalent to 
about seven times per capita GDP. Nevertheless, the amounts remitted are only a fraction of 
what the migrants would have been earning at home (Table 2).  
 
4.2  Involvement in Trade and Foreign Direct Investment 
 
After remittances, the financial channels through which high skilled emigrants are often 
thought to have most positive economic benefits for their home countries are through their 
involvement in trade and foreign direct investment. The experience of Indian, Taiwanese, and 
Chinese information technology firms has been used to suggest that a highly skilled diaspora 
can use their knowledge of the destination country to lower the costs of transacting across 
countries (Rauch and Trinidade, 2000; Kugler and Rapoport, 2005, Javorcik et al, 2010), and 
that emigrants can provide venture capital for starting new firms (Saxeenian, 2001, 2002). 
However, such studies and anecdotal evidence tends to focus on the cases where these 
linkages have occurred, and do not provide any information as to how common such 
experiences are, or to whether the experiences of high skilled IT workers from large 
economies are translatable to the types of countries where brain drain rates are much higher 
and domestic markets much smaller. 
  
 Our survey directly asked emigrants whether, in the past year, they had helped a home 
country firm make a trade deal, and if so, the value of this deal, and whether they had 
themselves directly exported goods from their home country to sell overseas, and the value. 
Panel C of Table 5 summarizes the results. We see that involvement in trade is very 
uncommon for this group of the best and brightest, with 3 percent of the Ghanaians, 4 percent 
of the Micronesians and Tongans, and 6 percent of the New Zealanders being involved in 
trade – the 10 percent figure for Papua New Guinea represents only 1 out of the 10 non-
student migrants from this country who answered this question carrying out such activities. 
One might argue that a low incidence of involvement may still have large overall impact if 
the occasions where deals are made involve large transactions. For example, one of the 
Ghanaian migrants in the sample facilitated a 500,000 cedi ($350,000) trade deal with a 
Ghanaian company, using his knowledge of Ghana to carry out due diligence on the company 
and his own company abroad to provide concessionary terms in the deal. A second example 
is the case of a migrant from Papua New Guinea, who met entrepreneurs in China during his 
work visits there, and informed them about the possibilities of importing vanilla from Papua 
New Guinea. He then contacted vanilla exporters in Papua New Guinea he knew, and linked 
them up, with an initial order of $250,000.  
  
 We therefore report the conditional mean and median value of these transactions, 
although note these are based on only one transaction for Papua New Guinea, 4 transactions 
in Micronesia, and 6 transactions in Ghana. There are a couple of large transactions, one in 
Papua New Guinea and one in Ghana, which push the conditional means up for these 
countries. Nevertheless, when we look at the unconditional means, the low frequency of such 
transactions reduces the means considerably.  
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 Given how rare such trade transactions are, we do not attempt to formally construct a 
counterfactual through regression analysis for what trade transactions these individuals would 
have been doing had they not migrated. Instead, we asked the non-migrants the same 
questions about trade deals, and take the mean values among non-migrants as the 
counterfactual. The last column of Table 5 then presents our estimate of the net impact of 
being a high-skilled emigrant on trade from the home country. For Tonga and Micronesia this 
net effect is negative, but close to zero: trade was uncommon among the non-migrants and 
the migrants, but the mean among non-migrants was slightly higher than the migrants. For 
Ghana, the mean effect is $5,346, although we cannot reject equality to zero. For Papua New 
Guinea, the one migrant making a trade deal made a large deal, but again we cannot reject 
equality to zero. Moreover, the value-added of this trade creation will depend on the profit 
margin of the trade deals – if this is only 10-25 percent of the transaction value, then the 
mean effect reduces to $500-1000 in Ghana. 
 
 Panel D provides the related answers for whether migrants are providing the capital to 
start up enterprises at home. Again this is infrequent, with 5 percent or fewer of the emigrants 
from New Zealand, Micronesia and Tonga doing this, and 8 percent of the Papua New 
Guineans. It is more common in Ghana, but the amounts invested are relatively small – a 
conditional mean of $18,000 and median of $2,100 for Ghana, suggesting that most of the 
businesses being invested in are very small, or that the migrant is not providing the main 
source of financing. Nevertheless, migrants are more likely to be making such investments in 
most countries than non-migrants are, and so our net effect in the last column, after taking out 
the mean for non-migrants is typically positive, although we cannot reject that it is zero.12 In 
addition, in answer to a separate question, none of the developing country migrants in our 
sample report holding shares in home country firms, showing that they are not making large 
investments in existing formally established companies. 
 
 In contrast, high-skilled emigrants are much more likely to be consumers of traded 
products from their home countries, often through what Orozco et al. (2005) term nostalgic 
trade. 87 percent of Ghanaian non-student migrants in our sample report having purchased 
Ghanaian food, drink or goods in their destination country, or having ordered goods directly 
from a Ghanaian retailer for their personal consumption. However, the mean (unconditional) 
value of goods ordered directly is only $183 and that of Ghanaian products purchased by 
migrants abroad is $443. Such nostalgic trade is also common among the New Zealand 
sample, with 87 percent of emigrants engaging in it,13 but less common amongst migrants 
from the small island nations: 47 percent of Micronesians engaged in such trade, with an 
unconditional mean value of such transactions of $337, and only 13 percent of Tongans did, 
with an unconditional mean value of $36.  Given the small numbers of high-skilled migrants 
in any particular emigrant destination and the small size of these transactions, these high-
                                                            
12  We formally test for equality to zero by regressing the unconditional amount invested on a dummy 
for being a current migrant, restricting analysis to the current migrant and non-migrant samples of 
non-students. 
13  The value of such trade was not asked for the New Zealand sample. 
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skilled emigrants are therefore unlikely to spur trade by serving as a significant export market 
in and of themselves. 
  
4.3  Non-financial Flows of Knowledge 
 
 In addition to providing financial support to households and firms in their home countries, 
high-skilled emigrants are often argued to benefit their home countries through knowledge 
transfer (e.g. Saxeenian, 2002, Newland, 2004, Kugler and Rapoport, 2005, Kerr, 2008). 
Although we are unable to place a monetary value on this knowledge transfer, our surveys at 
least allow us to provide empirical evidence on how common different types of knowledge 
flows are among the best and brightest, and to ask whether in fact emigrants engage in more 
of these types of knowledge flows than they would be doing had they not migrated. 
 
 Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of questions which asked current migrants 
whether they had engaged in each of a number of different knowledge transfer activities in 
the past year. The same questions were asked of non-migrants, and panel B therefore presents 
the net impact, taking non-migrants of the same age range and gender as the counterfactual 
for what the migrants would be doing had they not migrated. The first two rows of each panel 
look at knowledge transfer to the national Government and to home country companies. It is 
not very common for the best and brightest migrants to be providing this advice: only 4 
percent of Ghanaian and New Zealand emigrants, 8 percent of Papua New Guineans, and 13 
percent of Micronesians and Tongans had advised their governments. The greater incidence 
in the smaller countries may reflect the greater likelihood of migrants directly knowing 
policymakers in these small countries, rather than a greater tendency of these governments to 
reach out actively to their high-skilled emigrants. In panel B we see the net effect is, 
significantly negative in Ghana, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, showing that migrants 
engage in such interactions with the home government less often than non-migrants. There is 
no significant effect in Tonga or Micronesia. Knowledge transfer to home companies through 
migrants advising them is similarly infrequent, and has a negative net effect in three of the 
five countries, which is significant for New Zealanders. 
 
 A much more common form of knowledge transfer involves migrants transferring 
knowledge about opportunities to study and work abroad. Between 30 and 50 percent of 
high-skilled emigrants from these countries had advised someone in their home country about 
such opportunities in the past year, thereby aiding others in their migration decisions. 
Migrants are significantly more likely to be doing this than similar non-migrants from most 
countries. A more intensive form of migration facilitation is to act as the sponsor for a home 
country national wishing to work or study abroad. This is most common among Tongans, 
with 20 percent acting as a sponsor. It is least common amongst New Zealanders, with only 4 
percent doing this. Since this is something that can only be done when abroad, the net effect 
of sponsoring is the same as the gross effect. 
 
 Another frequent form of knowledge transfer involves migrants using their knowledge of 
their home country to advise people abroad about taking a holiday in their home country. 91 
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percent of New Zealanders, 75 percent of Papua New Guineans, 66 percent of Ghanaians, 56 
percent of Tongans and 44 percent of Micronesians have done this. Although our surveys do 
not permit quantification of the value of new tourism created by such advice, they do show 
migrants engaging in this type of tourism promotion much more frequently than non-migrants 
(with the exception of Micronesia). 
 
 Finally, we can examine whether migrants are transferring knowledge to home country 
researchers through research collaborations. This is not common for Tonga (4%) and 
Micronesia (8%), where there is little tertiary infrastructure and thus not a large local research 
community. However, it is somewhat common in Ghana (14%), New Zealand (16%), and 
Papua New Guinea (25%), showing that there is some evidence of this knowledge transfer. 
However, of course it is also possible for domestic researchers to work with researchers 
abroad, and panel B shows that migrants are not significantly more likely to be engaged in a 
research collaboration involving researchers in the home country and an abroad country than 
are non-migrants. 
 
4.4  Return Migration 
 
Developing countries are also believed to benefit from return migration, with individuals 
returning with physical and human capital earned abroad being more productive (Dustmann 
and Kirchkamp, 2002 and Mesnard, 2004). Return migration is also hypothesized to have 
broader payoffs to others in the home country through transfer of skills and knowledge 
gained abroad (Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay, 2003). Whilst much of this literature has 
focused on return migration in general, rather than return migration of the highest skilled, 
Zucker and Darby (2007) show high rates of return migration to Brazil, China and Taiwan (at 
least for sojourns) of top scientists, and Gundel and Peters (2008) show that high-skilled 
migrants are more likely to remigrate from Germany than low-skilled migrants, although 
return migration is less for migrants from non-EU countries. 
 
 Table 7 presents our estimates of the impacts of return migration in the five countries 
studied here. The first column presents the income gain estimated relative to non-migrants 
through the regression in equation (2). If return migrants are more productive (either as 
entrepreneurs or in wage jobs) we should expect them to be earning higher incomes. The only 
country with a marginally significant income gain from return migration relative to not 
migrating is Papua New Guinea. The point estimates are negative in Ghana and Tonga, and 
positive, but not significant in Micronesia and New Zealand. They are significantly less than 
the large income gains to be had from remaining abroad (Table 2). The standard errors are 
generally large relative to the mean, reflecting considerable heterogeneity in the wages 
earned by these high-skilled individuals in their home countries. Therefore we cannot rule out 
income gains from return migration, but there is not strong evidence for this.  
 
 In contrast, we do see return migrants have accumulated additional human capital 
relative to non-migrants. Columns 2 and 3 present the marginal effects from probit 
estimation, as in Table 4 panel C. Increased educational attainment is highest for return 
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migrants in Tonga and Micronesia, who have the most limited educational options at home, 
and lowest for the New Zealanders. In light of these significantly higher levels of education, 
it is somewhat surprising that we do not see more significant positive income gains from 
return migration. One possible reason for this is pay systems which reward tenure rather than 
productivity, which was a complaint of a good number of respondents in our surveys. 
 
 The fourth column of Table 7 provides the mean level of repatriated savings that 
individuals say they earned abroad and brought back with them when they returned. We do 
not have absolute savings levels, so cannot compare to a counterfactual of what they would 
have saved had they remained in their home countries. In Tonga, Micronesia and Papua New 
Guinea, the amounts are roughly similar in magnitude to annual remittances, and do not 
suggest migrants are returning with large accumulated wealth that they can use to make 
sizeable investments in the home country. The amounts are higher in Ghana and New 
Zealand. 
 
 The last columns look at whether return migrants are more likely to be engaging in trade 
deals, investing in business start-ups, and sharing knowledge than non-migrants. The point 
estimates are almost all positive, and are significant in a number of cases, providing some 
evidence to support the idea that return migration has benefits in these areas. Nevertheless, 
the monetary values of the trade deals and start-up investments are again generally not that 
large, particular if we were to consider only the profit or value-added of such transactions. 
Return migrants are more likely to be advising companies, and to be advising others about 
work and study opportunities abroad. 
 
4.5  Fiscal Impacts 
 
In one of the first academic studies on the brain drain, Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) drew 
attention to the possible fiscal cost. They noted that highly-skilled emigrants take their 
education with them, which was funded by taxes on existing residents, but then do not 
contribute back into the tax system. We would argue that whether or not education is publicly 
funded is ex post immaterial, since it is a sunk cost when it comes to the time of making a 
migration decision – what matters is whether the country loses more in the tax revenue (the 
return on the investment in tertiary education) it would collect from these individuals than it 
would spend on them going forward in terms of public services.14 This depends on how 
progressive the income taxation and benefits systems of the countries are. We attempt to 
provide some indication of the likely range of such costs for the countries in our study. 
 
 Table 8 details our attempts to calculate the first-order fiscal impact of emigration of the 
best and brightest. We begin by calculating the income tax that these individuals would be 
                                                            
14  Nyarko (2010) shows the typical annual cost per student in tertiary education is approximately 2 
times per capita income. So for Ghana, the cost of funding four years of tertiary education would 
be approximately 8*670 = US$5360 – or just slightly more than one year’s taxes at the mean for 
these top students in our sample. The ongoing tax revenues lost by absence are therefore far more 
important for this group than the initial costs of funding their education. 
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paying if at home. To do this we take the counterfactual income which migrants tell us they 
would be earning if at home (which we have seen appears to be reasonably accurate), and 
then use each countries income taxation schedule to calculate the tax per migrant, after which 
we present the mean and median tax in the table. The countries differ substantially in both tax 
rates and in the progressivity of their tax schedules. The lowest taxed and least progressive 
are Tonga and Micronesia. Tonga has a flat tax rate of 10%, and Micronesia has a tax rate of 
6% on the first $11,000 and 10% thereafter. Ghana, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand all 
have higher tax rates with more steps and progressivity. Ghana’s has five tax rates, with a top 
tax rate of 25% on income above $6,700. Papua New Guinea has six tax rates, with the first 
step beginning at 22% and with a top tax rate of 42% on income above $89,000.  New 
Zealand has 4 tax rates, with a top tax rate of 38% on income above $57,000. As a result of 
these low tax rates and low home country incomes, the loss in income tax revenue is only 
$1000-1200 for Tonga and Micronesia per high-skilled migrant. It is higher in the other three 
countries: $5,000 in Ghana, $14,000 in Papua New Guinea where the migrants believe they 
would be earning relatively high incomes at home and getting charged high tax rates, and 
$17,000 in New Zealand.  
 
This calculation assumes that there is no tax evasion. To check this assumption we 
compare the difference between reported gross and reported net incomes in each of our five 
countries to what we would calculate the tax payment to be based on the national tax tables. 
The actual tax reported by non-migrants and return migrants in their home countries are very 
similar to what we calculate as the tax they should be paying according to the tax rates. It 
therefore seems reasonable to assume that migrants would also pay the amount of tax we 
estimate if they were working in their home countries.  
 
 Next, we calculate the sales tax these migrants would have paid at home if they were 
consuming these counterfactual incomes in their home country. All five countries have sales 
taxes or goods and services taxes, with tax rates ranging from 5% in Micronesia, 10% in 
Papua New Guinea, and 12.5% in Ghana and New Zealand to 15% in Tonga. The Tongan 
government estimates that its goods and services taxes apply to approximately 60 percent of 
household consumption.15 We assume the same applies to the other three developing 
countries and to 90 percent of consumption for New Zealand, and that all income is spent to 
arrive at the sales tax figures in the next two columns of Table 6.16 This is highest in New 
Zealand at $7055 per migrant, reflecting the higher incomes and greater coverage of the sales 
tax net in this country, and lowest in Micronesia where the low tax rate and lower incomes 
means the lost sales tax revenue is only $383 per migrant. 
 
 Offsetting these fiscal costs of high-skilled emigration are two main fiscal benefits. The 
first is that if monetary remittances are spent on consumption items and the government has a 
sales tax, then the government gains a share of these remittances. We assume that 100 percent 
                                                            
15  ‘Utoikamanu (2006) ‘Consumption tax: The Tongan experience’ 
http://archives.pireport.org/archive/2007/July/07-27-rp.htm. 
16  Statistics New Zealand estimates that G.S.T. applies to 91 percent of the CPI.   
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of monetary remittances are spent, and that again 60 percent of this spending is taxable. 
Whilst there is debate in the literature as to the extent to which remittances are used for non-
consumption purposes, surveys typically find at least 80 percent of remittances are consumed, 
and even investments in items like materials for starting a business may be taxable. 
Nonetheless, because high-skilled migrants remit back considerably less than they would be 
earning in the home country, the effective sales tax revenues on remittances are quite small – 
ranging from only $56 in New Zealand and $41 in Micronesia, to $130-132 in Tonga and 
Ghana.  
 
 In most cases the larger fiscal benefit from emigration will be that the Government does 
not have to spend on government services for individuals abroad or the family members 
accompanying them. Table 8 gives the mean household size for the emigrants, which ranges 
from 2.5 to 4. We then form an upper bound on the fiscal savings by taking the total per-
capita government expenditure – this would be the savings if government expenditure was 
equally distributed across all households in the home country and all spending was variable 
costs. A possible lower bound on the fiscal savings in many countries can be obtained by 
taking the per-capita government health and expenditure expenditure, which might be more 
variable in costs. This may be a lower bound because it ignores the possibility that children of 
the highly skilled may be more likely to use expensive higher levels of education, and that it 
ignores any deductions or exemptions that reduce the tax that the highly educated actually 
pay. 
 
 Comparing these costs and benefits leads to our estimates of the approximate net fiscal 
cost of high-skilled emigration, given in the last two columns of Table 8. We get quite tight 
ranges on the likely first-order fiscal effects for the four developing countries. In both Tonga 
and Micronesia the net fiscal cost is at most $500-1000 per year, and would be negative if we 
used full government expenditure in the calculations. The fiscal costs are low in these 
countries because they have low income tax rates that are not very progressive, sales taxes are 
quite small because of low rates and low incomes, and the government per-capita spending is 
not much less (Tonga) or greater (Micronesia) than the estimated income tax take from even 
these highly skilled individuals. This reflects the reliance of Micronesia on grants from the 
U.S. (tax revenue is only 21% of total government revenue) and of Tonga on indirect taxes 
and grants.  
 
 In Ghana we estimate a net fiscal cost of between $5,450 and $6,300 per high-skilled 
emigrant. These bounds are quite tight, since Ghana’s per capita government expenditure is 
so low – Ghana has a progressive income taxation system which collects far more in income 
taxes from the highly skilled than it is paying out in benefits. Our bounds are even tighter in 
Papua New Guinea, ranging from $16,500 to $16,900. Again in this case per capita 
government expenditure is extremely low, and income tax rates on high incomes are quite 
high – so the fiscal cost greatly exceeds the fiscal benefits.  
 
 Our range of estimates is much wider for New Zealand, ranging from -$6,115 to 
$12,950, depending on how much of per capita government expenditure actually goes to the 
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highly skilled. Crawford and Johnson (2004) provide a more detailed analysis of the receipt 
of government benefits by decile in New Zealand for the year 1997/98. Because of New 
Zealand’s highly progressive government spending patterns, households in the top three 
deciles were estimated to receive only approximately $6,700 per household. Health and 
expenditure spending approximately doubled between 1998 and 2008, so doubling this figure 
gives a per household expenditure of approximately $13,400 – which is relatively close to our 
proxy of $11,302 when using per capita health and education spending. This gives our best 
estimate of the fiscal loss to New Zealand of high-skilled migration at $10,000 per high-
skilled migrant who leaves. 
 
 We acknowledge that there are a number of simplifying assumptions in making these 
calculations, but we believe they capture the first-order magnitudes.17 They show how much 
the fiscal cost depends on the progressivity of the income tax system, the role of sales taxes in 
allowing migrant-sending countries to receive some fiscal benefit from remittances, and some 
sense of the fiscal benefits. What is noticeable is how small these fiscal costs are relative to 
the income gains estimated to the migrants themselves in Table 2.  
 
4.6 Externalities 
 
These findings enable us to come close to being able to estimate the first-order net economic 
effect of highly-skilled emigration on individuals from developing countries.18 The one key 
effect we cannot measure is the uncompensated externalities of high human capital. Such 
externalities have been at the heart of brain drain debate since the beginning. Grubel and 
Scott (1966) noted that if labor markets are competitive and individuals paid their marginal 
product, then if there were no externalities, the departure of highly skilled emigrants would 
not reduce the welfare of those left behind. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974, p.19) made the case 
that such externalities could be important with ‘doctors and exceptionally gifted academics 
about whose emigration typically the underdeveloped countries seem to worry’, although 
Bhagwati (1998, p.9) subsequently notes that externalities are the ‘first refuge of the 
scoundrels’ in policy debates, with the evidence as to their existence, let alone magnitudes, 
rather scant.  
 
How big might these externalities be? Despite costly public subsidies to higher education 
around the world that are often motivated by a claimed importance of human capital 
externalities, empirical evidence on these externalities is fragmentary and often contradictory.  
In a careful, balanced review, Davies (2003) considered the empirical evidence for dynamic 
externalities, static market externalities and static non-market externalities. In terms of 
                                                            
17  In particular, it is an implicit assumption that taxes collected from non-migrants and return migrants would 
be unchanged if a current migrant had not migrated. But in small countries with limited opportunities to 
utilise specialised skills the labour demand curve may be quite steeply sloped. Hence if emigrants returned 
or had never left there may be lower earnings for other workers and a lower tax take. Our estimate net fiscal 
costs of emigration are therefore likely to be an upper bound. 
18  There are of course a large number of social impacts from migration, such as changes in access to cultural 
and travel opportunities, in access to amenities, in opportunities to consume certain products, and in impacts 
on relationships with family and friends. We do not attempt to value these factors in this paper, but 
acknowledge their importance in driving migration decisions. 
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percentage points of rates of return (to add on to Mincerian private rates of return of around 
8-10 percentage points), the most credible estimates of dynamic externalities were 1-2 
percentage points, the static market externalities were zero and the static non-market 
externalities around 3-4 percentage points.  
 
The evidence for dynamic externalities, of whether schooling causes growth, has been the 
most controversial in this literature. Positive human capital externalities should show up as 
higher macroeconomic returns to education (e.g. from an augmented Solow equation) than 
microeconomic returns (e.g. from a Mincer equation). Yet using this approach, Pritchett 
(2001) finds that the estimated growth impact of education is consistently less than what 
would be expected from the individual impacts, suggesting negative externalities. Similarly, 
Bils and Klenow (2000) find that most of the observed aggregate relationship between 
schooling and growth runs from expected growth to schooling, rather than the opposite of 
schooling causing growth.  
 
In terms of static market externalities, one approach has been to augment Mincer 
equations with a term for the average education of the neighborhood, city or state the 
individual lives in. For example, Rauch (1993) found that after controlling for own-
education, there was still an additional three percent increase in wages per year of average 
education in the metropolitan area an individual lived in. However, when Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2000) instrument for average education, using variation in states minimum school 
leaving ages, this apparent positive spillover disappears. 
 
Other compelling micro evidence on how proximity to highly skilled peers affects 
individual productivity comes from the random assignment of college roommates. One 
widely cited study found significant peer effects only for individuals in the middle of the 
skills distribution (proxied by SAT scores) whose GPA would be raised by about 2 percent 
when they have a roommate in the top 15% rather than the bottom 15% of the skills 
distribution (Zimmerman, 2003). In a less selective setting, which also has majors declared 
before freshman year, larger roommate effects were estimated for students in engineering, 
mathematics and natural sciences but not at all for students in humanities and social sciences 
(Brunello et al, 2010). This possibly reflects the ease of copying homework for questions 
with ‘right’ answers in the hard sciences, which is an externality unlikely to generalize to the 
economy-wide level. Similarly credible evidence of productivity spillovers in workplaces is 
mainly limited to single low-skilled occupations where data on effort and output are reliably 
measured, such as check-out (Mas and Moretti, 2009) and data entry (Kaur et al, 2010) 
operators. These studies find productivity spillovers to be very local and to be due to social 
pressure that leads to increased work effort rather than from greater output per time unit that 
may reflect learning.  
 
Studies that invoke non-market benefits of education often rely on a compilation of 
effects on outcomes such as civic participation, crime, fertility, health, longevity and political 
stability that were first summarized by Haveman and Wolfe (1984). These authors concluded 
that if these non-market effects were counted, they may double the social rate of return to 
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education. However many of the studies summarized could not adequately control for 
selectivity, in the form of family unobservables that cause both higher educational attainment 
and desirable social behavior, and so likely overstate the benefits of education. More 
compelling approaches, using intra-twin differences to control for unobservables, find 
negative rather than positive effects of education (Gibson, 2001). 
 
Thus the existing literature suggests that the value of the externalities is likely to be 
relatively small in terms of productivity spillovers and social benefits. However, the above 
studies do not get at the externalities on health of medical professionals, which is the source 
of some of the strongest concerns about brain drain. In our sample, only 5 percent of current 
migrants from Papua New Guinea, 6.6 percent from Micronesia, 7.7 percent from New 
Zealand, 14.4 percent from Ghana and 15.5 percent from Tonga are in the health field. We do 
not know of any credible microeconomic study which identifies the externality of a health 
professional. At a more aggregate level, Clemens (2007) finds no evidence of a relationship 
between the rate of health professional emigration and health outcomes in Africa, although 
Bhargava and Docquier (2008) find an association between emigration and adult deaths from 
AIDS in high HIV incidence countries. Given the low incidence of health professional 
migration in our sample, and that the HIV incidence rates in the countries studied are not in 
the high category, it therefore also seems likely that the health externalities from brain drain 
of the best and brightest are small. 
 
Combining the different channels we have looked at, we see that the positive effects of 
remittances, trade creation, and investment in business start-ups are typically of the same or 
larger magnitudes than the fiscal costs. Therefore in order for externalities to make the 
overall net impact of high-skilled migration negative for people from the sending countries, 
we would need the externalities to exceed the $50,000 or more per year that migrants gain 
from migrating.    
 
This would mean the externalities of high-skilled workers would have to be more than 
double or triple their private returns in the developing countries studied. Whilst conceivable, 
this would greatly exceed any measured externality we are aware of in the literature. Even 
taking the high range of externality estimates, of 5 percent per year of education, and 
applying them to 16 years of education, still would give an externality equal to 80 percent of 
the home country average unskilled wage – which is therefore in the order of $800 a year in 
the developing countries studied, or only 2 percent of the private gains. 
 
4.7  How Sensitive are these Results to Non-response? 
 
The data collected here are unique, and are the result of an exhausting multi-year exercise in 
identifying and tracking top students. Nevertheless, in interpreting these results one would 
like to know how sensitive they are to survey non-response. There are two aspects to this. 
First, one would like to know whether the rates of migration we obtain are biased due to 
differences in survey response rates between migrants and non-migrants. Second, and more 
importantly for this paper, one would like to know whether the characteristics of the 
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individuals we do survey differ from those who aren’t surveyed, potentially leading us to 
understating or overstating the impacts of high-skilled migration. 
 
 We have several approaches to detailing with the first issue, of whether our surveying is 
more likely to capture migrants than non-migrants or vice versa. The first is to note from a 
practical perspective, given the range of methods used to try and track people included 
searches in both origin and destination countries, and that these high-skilled individuals are 
likely to have internally migrated since high-school even if they don’t migrate abroad, there 
is not a systematic bias in tracking one or the other group. Second, we can use the data on the 
locations of individuals who we found but did not survey together with our survey data to 
obtain bounds on migration. The percentage of 22 and older individuals who are current 
migrants can be bounded at 52.2 to 65.3 percent for Tonga, 34.1 to 66.5 percent for 
Micronesia, 20.8 to 69.1 percent for New Zealand, 3.2 to 69.0 percent for Papua New Guinea, 
and 13.4 to 80.7 percent for Ghana. These bounds show high levels of migration in all 
countries but PNG.  
 
 Third, we can see whether the individuals who we did survey who required more effort 
to track down have different migration patterns from those who required less effort. The 
surveying process took place over up to one year after the sample frame was formed in each 
country and typically involved local survey firms who also had links to diaspora. The survey 
firms made a first pass through the entire frame, first interviewing the more easily tracked 
individuals (whether at home or abroad). More detailed efforts were then spent following up 
on those who couldn’t be initially tracked, often using specialists in online and social 
networking searches.19 Since the individuals interviewed later in the survey therefore required 
more attempts and more effort to interview than those interviewed earlier in time we split the 
sample at the median in terms of interview date by country, and then compare the migration 
status of those interviewed in the first half of the sample (who required less effort) to those 
interviewed in the second half (who required more effort). Conditional on age and sex, we 
find no significant difference in the likelihood of being a current migrant for those who 
required more effort to those who required less effort to interview. 
 
 We use this same idea to examine the robustness of our estimates of the consequences of 
migration. For example, we augment equation (1) to be: 
 
ܫܰܥܱܯܧ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܥܷܴܴܧܰܶܯܫܩܴܣܰ ௜ܶ ൅ ߛᇱ ௜ܺ 
൅ߜܮܣܶܧ௜ ൅ ߠܮܣܶܧ௜ כ ܥܷܴܴܧܰܶܯܫܩܴܣܰ ௜ܶ ൅ ߝ௜  (3) 
 
where LATEi is an indicator of whether individual i was one of the second-half of the 
individuals interviewed, who required more effort and more attempts to get to respond. The 
first column of Table 9 then reports the p-value by country for testing that θ = 0, that is for 
                                                            
19  The average cost per finally achieved sample member was approximately US$200 (excluding our 
own time contributions), but was considerably higher for respondents who took more iterations to 
track and obtain their survey response. 
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testing that the income gain for migrants who require more effort to survey is the same for 
those who required less effort to survey. In Ghana and PNG the point estimates are positive, 
suggesting it was those migrants earning more who took more effort to reach, while in the 
other three countries the point estimates are negative, but in no case is the difference 
significance. This provides us with some confidence that we are not just reaching the most 
successful migrants, thereby overstating the income gains. One can think of reasons why the 
more successful will be easier to reach (more famous, perhaps more willing to discuss their 
experiences), but also reasons they will be harder to interview (higher value of time, may 
have broken off ties with people at home to avoid demands for money, etc.). Given the likely 
heterogeneity in reasons for non-response, these reasons may cancel one another out on 
average, leading us to obtain reasonable estimates of the average effect. 
 
 The next few columns of Table 9 show similarly that we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of no difference between easier to interview and harder to interview individuals in terms of 
the impacts of current migration on educational attainment, remittances, or advising a 
domestic company.20 The only significant difference occurs for advising others about work 
abroad, which the Tongans who it took more effort to reach are more likely to be doing than 
those who took less effort to reach. Given this is only one out of 38 cells in the table that is 
significant at the 5 percent level, this seems the result of pure chance. The final columns of 
Table 9 similarly examine whether the impacts of return migration in Table 7 differ according 
to how hard it was to interview the return migrants, and again show no significant 
differences. Based on these results, it seems plausible to argue that survey non-response is not 
having a major impact on our results.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The number of highly educated emigrants from developing countries living in the OECD 
doubled between 1990 and 2000 (Docquier and Marfouk, 2005), and has continued to grow 
over the past decade as developed countries have increasingly made their immigration criteria 
more skill-selective. As policymakers in high emigration countries watch the departure of 
many of their most talented citizens, they both worry about the potential costs of this ‘brain 
drain’ for development in their country as well as wonder about the possibilities offered by 
having a diaspora of the elite who can send remittances and facilitate trade, investment, and 
knowledge exchanges. Our goal in this paper has been to provide the first systematic 
microeconomic empirical evidence as to how common these key channels of interaction 
between migrants and their home countries are, and what the economic costs and benefits 
appear to be in practice.  
 
Our results show large positive benefits of high-skilled migration for citizens of high 
emigration countries. The largest benefits are to the migrants themselves, who benefit 
through massive gains in income and through greater human capital. High-skilled individuals 
                                                            
20  The specific outcomes examined here are some of the more important ones for our study. Given 
the extremely low number of individuals participating in trade and FDI, we do not attempt to look 
at these outcomes in smaller subsamples. 
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from poorer countries do typically remit, but it is rare for them to engage in trade or foreign 
direct investment. They engage in plenty of knowledge transfer in terms of helping others 
learn about study and work opportunities abroad, but do not frequently advise their local 
governments or businesses in their home countries. Return migration is common, and we find 
return migrants more likely to be engaging in knowledge transfer than non-migrants but not 
to have higher levels of productivity. The main cost we measure is the fiscal cost of 
emigration. We show how this varies significantly with the progressivity of the tax system 
and size of government expenditure, with minimal tax implications in Tonga and Micronesia, 
and possible fiscal losses from high-skilled emigration of $6,300 per high-skilled migrant per 
year for Ghana, $10,000 for New Zealand, and $16,900 for Papua New Guinea. The 
measured benefits greatly exceed the measured costs, suggesting that on net high-skilled 
migration is improving the living standards of individuals born in countries with high-levels 
of emigration. 
 
There are two caveats to this conclusion. The first is that we are not able to fully measure 
the distributional consequences of this high-skilled migration, since our sample is only of the 
best and brightest. Nevertheless, the size of the net gains is so large, that these distributional 
impacts are likely to be of second-order in any welfare calculations. Secondly, our analysis is 
restricted to a set of relatively small countries which face high levels of emigration. The 
impacts of high-skilled emigration are likely to be quite different for large countries such as 
China and India. Ours is the first comprehensive micro-level assessment of the channels 
through which high-skilled emigration operates, and we see it as a productive area for future 
research for this approach to be extended to other countries, and potentially to other sample 
frames of interest other than the top academic achievers. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Detailed Information on the Sample Frame in Each Country (not for publication) 
 
In each country we obtained a sample frame of the top academic achievers graduating 
secondary school in the country over the 1976 to 2004 period. Different educational systems 
and differences in record-keeping mean that the definition of a top academic achiever varies 
slightly from one country to another, as we discuss here. But in each country, the individuals 
chosen are by at least one metric the top students in their country in the year of their 
graduation. 
 
 
Ghana 
 
We selected the following 13 secondary schools for the study: Aburi Girls, Accra Academy, 
Achimota, Adisadel College, Ghana National College, Holy Child School, Mfantsipim 
College, Opoku Ware Secondary School, Prempeh College, Presbyterian Secondary School, 
St. Augustine’s College, Tamale Secondary School, and Wesley Girl’s High School. This list 
was chosen on the basis of performance in A-level and Senior Secondary School 
examinations over the past 30 years, and selected schools which were selected by Africa 
Almanac as being among Africa’s top 100 high schools, 
(see http://www.africaalmanac.com/top20highschools.html),  
as well as schools which supplied the most students admitted to KNUST (a premier 
university of science and technology). Additionally we chose Tamale Secondary School to 
get students from the far north of Ghana, who might not otherwise make the sample. At each 
school we then worked with the school to obtain the names of the top five students graduating 
in each year between 1976 and 2004, using school records of which students received the 
most subject prizes in their senior year and of examination performance on the A-level or 
SSSCE examinations. 
 
 
Micronesia 
 
In the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the sample frame consisted of the valedictorian, 
salutatorian, and where available, third-placed student from high school classes graduating 
between 1976 and 2004. This sample frame was constructed by contacting 15 high schools on 
four islands of FSM: Chuuk, Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Yap. Not all of these schools had been in 
existence throughout the whole period, so for more recently established schools we just used 
the years in existence. Given this, the majority of the sample comes from the more 
prestigious, longer established schools of Xavier High School, Pohnpei Island Central School 
(PICS), Yap High School, Seventh Day Adventist High School, and Kosrae High School, but 
the sample frame essentially covers almost all available secondary schooling on these islands. 
The names of the top students were obtained from school records. 
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New Zealand 
 
The sample frame in New Zealand is comprised of four groups of individuals who excelled 
academically: Members of New Zealand’s Mathematical Olympiad team over the 1988 to 
2004 period (73 individuals); Members of New Zealand’s Chemistry Olympiad team over the 
1992 to 2004 period (48 individuals); Top scholars in the University Bursary examinations 
over the period 1991-2004, which are the final year examinations taken by almost all students 
(484 individuals); and over the 1976-91 period, the Duxes of 16 secondary schools which had 
supplied many of the individuals in the first groups (271 individuals). The reason for these 
overlapping groups is that New Zealand only began participating in the Mathematical and 
Chemistry Olympiads in 1988 and 1992 respectively, and only publicly named and awarded 
prizes to the top performers in the Bursary examinations beginning in 1991. The Dux is the 
equivalent of the valedictorian in the United States, and is the student who has the highest 
academic performance amongst final year students in a school. These groups are discussed 
further in the appendix to Gibson and McKenzie (2010), which also provides additional 
information on the Papua New Guinea and Tonga samples. 
 
 
Papua New Guinea 
 
Papua New Guinea has the lowest secondary school enrolment rate of any of the countries in 
our study, with net secondary enrolment less than 20%. Historically, there was a major 
winnowing of students first at grade 6, and then at grade 10. Grades 11 and 12 were only 
taught at four National High Schools. School records in Papua New Guinea were almost non-
existent, with no school magazines or boards displaying the names of top students to provide  
a record of who the top students were. The only formal sampling frame came from the Office 
of Higher Education (OHE), which allocates slots and scholarships for tertiary study. It 
provided the names of the 264 students who had achieved a 4.0 GPA in their Grade 12 
national examinations during 1995-98 and 2000-2004. On average only 0.7% of Grade 12 
exam entrants achieved this perfect GPA. For 1976-94 our sample frame consists of the 
Duxes and Proxime Accesits from the National High Schools. We obtained the names of 93 
of the 152 potential individuals on this list by asking former students and teachers at these 
schools, and through radio and television advertisements.  
 
 
Tonga 
 
Our sample frame consists of the Dux and Proxime Accesit from the top three high schools 
on the main island of Tongatapu (Tonga High School, Tonga College, and Queen Salote), 
and from two main schools in the Outer Islands (Vava’u High School and Taufa’ahau I 
Pilolevu College (TPC) in Ha’apai. For each we take the top scholars over the 1976-2004 
period, except for Va’vau High Schoo which only opened in 1985. Websites of these schools 
provided some initial information on the names of the top students. Each of the schools was 
then visited and school teachers and librarians helped to reconstruct the list, using school 
records and old school magazines.  
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Table 1: Sample Sizes, Response Rates, and Migration Rates
# in sample # of survey Survey %  # of current % of 22+ who % of 22+ who
Country  frame  respondents Rate Number % female migrants ever migrated are current migrants
Ghana 1851  283 15.3 605 32.7 36.6  106 59.9 37.6
Micronesia  472 157 33.3 319 67.6 59.2  65 84.1 41.4
New Zealand  851 371 43.6 476 55.9 39.9  155 67.8 44.4
Papua New Guinea  691 236 34.2 298 43.1 34.2  22 36.8 9.5
Tonga  266 193 72.6 245 92.1 52.3  98 85.7 48.2
Total  4131  1240 30.0 1943 47.0 39.4  446 64.6 35.8
Notes: 
% female, number of current migrants, % of 22+ who ever migrated and who are current migrants pertains to the sample, not the population.
Current Location known:
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Table 2: Annual Gross Income Gain from Migrating at Market Exchange Rates
A‐B A‐C Regression Regression 2SLS
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Mean Estimate 1 Estimate 2 Estimate
Country (S.D.) (S.D.) (S.D.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Ghana 101696 76986 22565 13712 24627 14064 79131 77069 73883 72878 n.a.
(87543) ( 30468) (38159) ( 12524) (13820)
Micronesia 57261 44200 22286 18200 17205 20000 34975 40057 35538 42135 40773
(43044) (15631) (9716) (7596) (8920) (33245)
New Zealand 115505 83707 75139 61077 65614 60753 40365 49890 44788 46155 n.a.
(89287) (51249) (33696) (9484) (10943)
Papua New Guinea 92660 73500 24623 13710 43061 28599 68038 49599 42942 48803 n.a.
(60187) (27655) (36373) (18647) (18453)
Tonga 88156 60991 12593 8772 11325 9640 75563 76832 68991 62436 n.a.
(96201) (15986) (10099) (22536) (20275)
Note:
All estimates are for individuals currently employed and who are non‐students
Regressions control for 5‐year age groups and sex, country of birth, mother and father's education, and self‐assessed family wealth at 
the end of high school. Estimate 2 also contains a dummy variable for being a return migrant.
Instrumental variable for Micronesia is experiencing a typhoon in their home region when aged 18 to 22, first stage F‐statistic is 3.63 (p=0.06).
A: Annual income B: Annual income
at home of return
C: Annual income
current migrants expect
migrants (USD) and non‐migrants (USD) to earn at home (USD)
Estimate of Annual Income Gainabroad of current
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Alternative Measures of Income Gain
Gross Gain   Gross Gain adjusted Net Gain Net Gain adjusted
Table 2 Gross Gain adjusted for cost‐of‐living and at Market for cost‐of‐living
Reg. estimate 2 for cost‐of‐living hardship  Exchange Rates and hardship 
Ghana 72878 63128 67141 49952 45619
(13820) (14475) (14240) (9681) (9826)
Micronesia 42135 46339 46214 32019 34735
(8920) (9677) (9166) (6663) (6718)
New Zealand 46155 25329 32771 33536 21258
(10943) (11749) (11131) (7126) (6899)
Papua New Guinea 48803 35700 37646 47559 29590
(18453) (7914) (7082) (20058) (5417)
Tonga 62436 65339 59522 47777 41723
(20275) (25863) (23619) (13258) (14511)
Notes:
Cost‐of‐living adjustment and hardship adjustments provided by Xpatulator.com. See text for details on what these 
measure. Net gains reflect reported income tax paid by survey respondents in each country.
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Table 4: Human Capital Formation of individuals aged 22 and older
Proportion
Proportion Proportion of those Proportion Proportion of those who took actions
who have with this qualification who have with this qualification due to prospect
this qualification who earned it abroad this qualification who earned it abroad of migration
Panel A: Migrants
Ghana 0.99 0.39 0.73 0.86 0.29
Micronesia 0.50 1.00 0.18 1.00 0.19
New Zealand 1.00 0.13 0.77 0.75 0.07
Papua New Guinea 0.91 0.25 0.64 1.00 0.10
Tonga 0.84 1.00 0.42 1.00 0.14
Panel B: Individuals in Home Country
Ghana 0.98 0.06 0.49 0.28 0.32
Micronesia 0.40 0.90 0.16 0.83 0.16
New Zealand 0.99 0.01 0.57 0.19 0.08
Papua New Guinea 0.86 0.10 0.30 0.49 0.16
Tonga 0.69 0.95 0.34 1.00 0.20
Panel C: Estimates of the Impact of Being a Current Migrant on Educational Attainment
Likelihood of having a bachelors degree Likelihood of having an advanced degree
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Ghana n.a. 0.280*** 0.070
Micronesia 0.251 0.157 0.848*** 0.057
New Zealand n.a. 0.259*** 0.057
Papua New Guinea 0.092 0.058 0.451*** 0.117
Tonga 0.551*** 0.129 0.805*** 0.049
Notes: Panel C estimates are marginal effects from probit estimation for the sample aged 22 and above, with
5‐year age groups, gender, country of birth, parental education, and family wealth while in high school as controls
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
n.a. indicates estimate not available due to almost everyone having a bachelors degree
Bachelor's Degree Masters, Law, Medical Doctor, or PhD Degree
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Table 5: Annual Monetary Flows from Migrants to Home Country
Net effect after
All current Non‐student Conditional Conditional Unconditional Unconditional subtracting mean for
migrants current migrants Mean Median Mean Median non‐migrants (USD)
Panel A: Monetary Remittances (annual)
Ghana 0.86 0.93 4334 2109.6 3732 1758 3732***
Micronesia 0.69 0.68 2187 1000 1359 500 1359***
New Zealand 0.24 0.26 2476 486 625 0 625***
Papua New Guinea 0.89 0.90 6099 2681 6085 2681 6085***
Tonga 0.63 0.76 4682 2651 3122 1446 3122***
Panel B: Goods and In‐kind Remittances (annual)
Ghana 0.74 0.75 1935 703 1290 352 1290***
Micronesia 0.67 0.68 625 450 577 400 577***
New Zealand n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea 0.90 0.91 1355 536 1232 357 1232***
Tonga 0.63 0.61 2506 1446 1319 482 1319***
Panel C: Help a home country firm make a trade deal or exported goods from home country to overseas in last year
Ghana 0.02 0.03 100734 25666 5596 0 5436
Micronesia 0.07 0.04 2918 325 307 0 ‐147
New Zealand 0.04 0.06 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea 0.14 0.10 250244 250244 25024 0 24939
Tonga 0.03 0.04 2555 2555 91 0 91
Panel D: Invested in a business start‐up in the home country in last year
Ghana 0.17 0.22 18002 2110 3750 0 2445
Micronesia 0.04 0.05 30050 30050 1582 0 893
New Zealand 0.02 0.02 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea 0.14 0.08 537 537 45 0 ‐5
Tonga 0.05 0.04 4844 4844 404 0 404
Notes: Values are for sample of migrants who are not currently students.
Goods remittances and the value of trade deals and value of business start‐ups were not asked of the New Zealand sample.
*, **, and *** indicate net impact is significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.
Proportion who sent flow Annual Value in USD
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Table 6: Annual Non‐financial flows
Panel A: Proportion of current migrants who are not students engaging in activity in last year
Ghana Micronesia New Zealand Papua New Guinea Tonga
Provided advice to national Government 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.13
Advised a home country company 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.25 0.08
Provided advice about study abroad 0.53 0.54 0.26 0.58 0.36
Provided advice about work abroad 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.83 0.44
Sponsored home country national to work/study abroad 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.20
Carried out research with people in home country 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.25 0.04
Acted as an official representative an overseas event 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.25 0.16
Advised people overseas about a holiday in home country 0.66 0.44 0.91 0.75 0.56
Panel B: Net impact relative to non‐migrants 
Ghana Micronesia New Zealand Papua New Guinea Tonga
Provided advice to national Government ‐0.16*** 0.18 ‐0.08* ‐0.26** ‐0.01
Advised a home country company ‐0.13 0.08 ‐0.29*** ‐0.26 0.02
Provided advice about study abroad 0.18** ‐0.03 0.13** 0.36** 0.04
Provided advice about work abroad 0.14 ‐0.10 0.28*** 0.62*** 0.09
Carried out research in a home/abroad collaboration 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.13 ‐0.12
Acted as an official representative an overseas event 0.07 ‐0.11 0.01 0.10 0.11
Advised people overseas about a holiday in home country 0.29*** ‐0.03 0.41*** 0.51*** 0.16
*, **, and *** indicate significance of net impact at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. Net impact is coefficient on
current migrant in a linear regression of the outcome on migration status, sex, and five year age group.
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Table 7: Impacts of Return Migration
Income Having a Having an Repatriated Trade Invested Advise Advise
Gain (USD) Bachelors Advanced Savings Deals in Business Advise Advise on work on study
Degree Degree Mean (USD) (USD) Start‐up (USD) Govt. Company abroad abroad
Ghana ‐2067 n.a.1. 0.210** 24639 574 3641 0.05 0.19** 0.33*** 0.28***
(9618) (0.078) (616) (2306) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Micronesia 8463 0.206 0.686*** 3384 27320 364** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.21 ‐0.08
(5898) (0.152) (0.054) (34237) (179) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15)
New Zealand 2871 n.a.1. 0.101 53707 n.a.2 n.a.2. 0.08 ‐0.07 0.34*** 0.14*
(8877) (0.066) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Papua New Guinea 9089* 0.056 0.333*** 4697 9912** 6065 0.28*** 0.01 0.35*** 0.51***
(5331) (0.060) (0.096) (4307) (4766) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Tonga ‐8670 0.455*** 0.957*** 7828 2499 482 0.23 0.29** 0.11 0.43***
(21788) (0.097) (0.025) (3202) (410) (0.14) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16)
Notes:
n.a.1. denotes not available due to almost all having a bachelors degree.
n.a.2. denotes not available due to values not being asked.
Table 8: Annual Fiscal Effects
Mean Per‐capita Per‐capita
Household Govt.  Govt. health & Using full Using health
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Size Expenditure education expenditure govt. exp. & edn. Exp.
Ghana 4999 2430 1655 791 280 132 3.12 290 20 5469 6312
Micronesia 965 600 383 300 41 15 3.08 1378 259 ‐2939 509
New Zealand 17255 14450 7055 6379 57 0 2.50 12147 4521 ‐6115 12950
Papua New Guinea 14537 8547 2588 1719 131 58 4.00 134 21 16458 16910
Tonga 1204 964 1083 868 281 130 3.60 784 257 ‐815 1081
Fiscal  Costs  of Emigration Fiscal  Benefits  of Emigration
Approx.  Net Fiscal  CostIncome Tax Migrants
Would pay if at home Would pay i f at home
Sales  tax migrants   Sales  tax i f 
remittances  consumed
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Table 9: Are more difficult to find migrants different?
P‐values on test of difference in estimates by interview date
Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 6 Table 6 Table 7 Table 7 Table 7
Country Income Gain Masters degree Amount Remitted Advise work Advise company Income gain Advanced Degree Advise work
Ghana 0.655 0.357 0.602 0.789 0.295 0.903 0.742 0.940
Micronesia 0.270 0.981 0.931 0.284 0.175 0.265 n.a. 0.368
New Zealand 0.715 0.282 0.197 0.484 0.984 0.119 0.387 0.802
Papua New Guinea 0.450 0.362 0.282 0.250 0.134 0.567 0.976 0.569
Tonga 0.144 0.172 0.475 0.045 0.577 0.240 n.a. 0.729
Impact of being a current migrant Impact of being a return migrant
